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OF UTAH, HAJJ S. BENNETT, 
W. R. McENTIRE, and STEW-
ART M. HANSON, c·ommissioners 
of the Public Service Commission 
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GAS C.OMP ANY, a corporation, 
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Commissioners of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 
CALVIN L. RAMP TON, 
Attorney for Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 
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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY, 
a corporation1 
Petitioner, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC· SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, 
W. R. McENTIRE, and STEW-
ART M. HANSON, Commissioners 
of the Public Service Commission 
of Utah, and UTAH NATURAL 
GAS COMPANY, a corporation, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENTS 
BRIEF OF RE.SPONDENTS 
PuBLIC SERVICE CoMMISSION OF UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, 
W. R. McENTIRE and STEWART M. fuNSON, 
Commissioners of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 
INTRODUCTION 
The respondents, Public Service Commission of 
Utah, Hal S. Bennett, W. R. McEntire and Stewart M. 
Hanson, Commissioners of the Public S·ervice Commis-
sion of Utah submit the following brief in answer to the 
brief of the Petitioner heretofore filed. 
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2 
The Public Service Commission of Utah will make 
no effort to answe,r paragraph by paragraph and case by 
case the very voluminous Brief of the Petitioner which is 
now on file·. Much of the argument and nearly all of the 
cases contained in that Brief are, in the opinion of the 
Public Service c·ommission, inapplicable here for reasons 
which will be hereafter pointed out. All of the matters 
raised on the Brief of the Petetioner can be· resolved by 
answering of three fundamental questions. First, does the 
Public Service Commission have the power to issue a con-
ditional Certificate of Convenience and Necessity; Sec-
ond, did the Public Service c·ommission make any unlaw-
ful delegation of its authority; and Third, was the Public 
Service Commission in its rights in proceeding to hear the 
application of Utah Natural Gas Company and to decide 
the issues therein involved before hearing the applica-
tion of Utah Pipe Line Company. 
In addition to these questions, the Public Service 
Commission again wishes to raise before this Court the 
question raised on the Motion to Dismiss the Writ of 
Certiorari. Namely, does the petitioner, Utah Pipe Line 
Company, have a justiciable interest in the controversy 
now presented to the court. The respondent would like 
to restate its argument in regard to this latter point 
and then proceed to the consideration of the matters 
raised in the Brief of the p·etitioner. 
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THE PETITIONER DOES NOT HAVE A JUSTICIABLE 
INTEREST IN THE CONTROVERSY IN THIS ACT~ON 
It is fundamental that in order to maintain a legal 
action, the person--bringing the action must have a legal 
interest in the subject matter of the. controversy. This 
court in the case of Gianulak~ts v. Sharp, (71 Utah 528) 
in considering the claim of the plaintiff in a water con-
troversy stated : 
".Before the plaintiff in this suit can be heard 
to complain because he has been deprived of the 
use of the water flo,ving from the springs in ques-
tion, he must establish some right to the use of 
the water or a part thereof. Even though it be 
conceded that defendants title is weak, that fact 
alone does not entitle plaintiff to any relief." 
Therefore, regardless of how weak the case of the 
Utah Natural Gas c·ompany might be, if in fact the peti-
tioner has no·property right to protect in this proceed-
ings, it has no standing before this court. 
The fact that the petitioner might conceivably at 
some future date acquire some rights which might be 
affected by the outcome of this controversy does not 
entitle it at the present time to institute a legal proceed-
ings. In the case of State v. Superior Court for King 
County (131 Pac. (2d) 943), the Supreme Court of 
Washington stated: 
"It is also a well-recognized rule that to en-
title a person to institute a cause. of action, he 
must show that he has some real interest therein. 
His interest must be a present, substantial in-
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terest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, 
or future, contingent interest, and he must show 
that he will be benefited by the relief granted. 
39 Am. Jr. 860, P. 10. It is also a well recognized 
principle that public wrongs or neglect or breach 
of public duty cannot be redressed in a suit in 
the name of an individual or individuals whose 
interest in the right asserted does not differ from 
that of the public generally, or who suffers in-
jury in common with the public generally." 
Similar language is found in a Wyoming case, 
Campbell v. Wyoming Development Company (100 Pac. 
(2d) 124) at Page 140 of this opinion the Wyoming court 
states: 
"Before a party may attack the right of an-
other, either on constitutional or other grounds, 
he must first show that he himself has a right 
which has been invaded thereby. He must have an 
interest which is affected. 11 Am. J ur. 849; 19 
C.J. 1039, 1040; Clark v. Duncanson, 79 Okl. 180 
192 P. 806, 16 A.L.R. 315; Williams v. San Pedro, 
153 Cal. 44, 94 P. 234; Davis v. Minnesota Baptist 
Convention, 45 Wyo. 148, 154, 16 P. 2d 48; Gian-
ulakis v. Sharp, 71 Utah 528,267 P.1017. The-re is 
no reason why we should intermeddle. with the 
claims of another, unless he has such interest." 
The rule is well summed up hy the authors of the 
American Jurisprudence in 39 J ur. 859 as follows : 
"In considering the proper person to institute 
a judicial proceeding one should bear in mind 
the fundamental principle that courts are insti-
tuted to afford relief to persons whose rights have 
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been invaded, or are threatened with invasion, by 
the defendant's acts or ronduct, and to give relief 
at the instance of such persons, a court may and 
properly should refuse to entertain an action at 
the instance of one whose rights have not been 
invaded- or infringed, as where he seeks to invoke 
a remedy in behalf of another who seeks no re-
dress. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the court to enforce private rights or main-
tain a civil action for the enforcement of such 
rights unless he has in an individual or repre-
sentative capacity some real interest in the cause 
of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or 
interest in the subject matter of the controversy. 
To enable one to maintain an action to enforce 
private rights, he must show that he has sustained 
some injury to his personal or property rights. 
The principle that one without pecuniary interest 
has no judicial standing runs through our juris-
prudence." 
What right of the petitioner has been invaded by 
the granting of the Certificate of Convenience and N eces-
sity to the Utah Natural Gas c·ompany~ None. of its 
rights could be invaded because it had no rights in such 
matter. It is true that it did have an application on 
file for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity of its 
own and it may well be that it has a right to have such 
petition heard, however it can not very well be argued 
that it has a right to have it heard prior to the petition 
of the Utah Natural Gas Company which had previously 
been filed, nor can it be argued that it had a right to have 
its petition heard prior to the time that the decision was 
rendered in the Utah Natural Gas C.ompany case. If 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
such were the rule, succerssive applications Inight forever 
prevent the decision on any application for a certificate 
merely by having successive applicants filed by differ-
ent companies for substantially the same rights. If 
the petitioner feels agrieved because its petition has not 
been heard, its proper remedy would be a Writ of Man-
damus to compel the commission to hear its petition. 
However, until its petition is heard and it has actually 
been granted a franchise, it has not property rights 
which should be recognized by this court. 
There were many protestants to the petition of the 
Utah Natural Gas Company's application, many of which 
would have actual rights at stake. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company is already serving gas in the area proposed 
to be served by the Utah Natural Gas Company and 
clearly has a property right which it could have called 
upon this court to p-rotect. Likewise many users of na-
tural gas appeared as protestants. While their rights are 
somewhat remote, the cases generally held that they have 
a justiciable interest in such a matter and may secure 
judicial review thereof. However, the one protestant 
that chooses to seek the review of this court is the one 
protestant that has no conceivable right or justiciable 
interest in the subject matter of the writ. 
The Petitioner here is in much the same position 
as a low bidder on a public contract who seeks to se-
cure judicial review of the award of the. contract to 
someone other than the low bidder. It is well established 
that such bidder prior to the time· he has been awarded 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
a contract has no right 'vhieh the courts will recognize. 
In this regard the follo"ing language is found on: lYage i 
2.34 of Donnelly on Public Contracts: , .:llOk ··_.:,ttiDd J:D'l.B 
, I ' • ."0 · 1 ; ' i 
44-The provisions ·of the statutes relating '"'to the· 
·awarding of public contracts arelfor the benefit 
". ·~i of:·the property owners iand tax payers of the. 
. . public body and not in the interest or f<;>·r the bene-. 
fit of contractors or bidders for public work. An. 
unSUCCessful bidder may not maintain a suit' forE 
their violation * * * neither can the lowest bidders i 
compel a Writ of Mandamus to fo;rce public of-
o:t -, ficers to enter into a contract with them." 
1 H ! • ·, .:~ L · ~ · ~. rurct 
See:13lso in this connection Colorado Paving Com-
. ' . . J 
pf!,;ny.v. Murphy (78 Fed. 28). 1 ha.n 
A' ·case almost exactly analogous· to, the· ,~ase now 
berore this court was the case of Aller & Sharp Inc. vs. 
United States, et al. This case was decided by a three man 
court in the southern district of Ohio on March 20, r1951. 
It;has not been reported in Federal Reporter/but appears I 
as Case No. 80648 in the advance sheets o.f' the F·etleraH 
Carrier ,Reporter. In that case an application was niade 
to the Interstate Comme.rce Commission for a tcertifi:.. 
cate) of ·convenience and Necessity· to· engage as a''~com ... · 
mon carrier of .certain specified co:mmodi ties J- between 
Chillicothe, Ohio, and certain other. points in the states 
:: i' ' "d . ' I, ' ' , I , 
~.f Illinois and ~ndiana. One of the protestant~ in the 
case ,was Aller & Sharp, Inc., which company was also 
engaged as a· ·public carrier of property but not in the 
saine area for which the·. n·ew rights weref'<being kought. 
Aller & .Sh~~p, ~ow:ever pr~test~d.· o~ the .iro·®ds that 
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as they were in the transportation business in an adjoin-
ing area, they might subsequently acquire rights in the 
area being sought by the petition and therefore had an 
interest in the matter. The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission granted the rights sought and Aller & Sharp 
appealed to the U.S. ·District Court, the case being heard 
as the law pro:vides by the District Judge and two Judges 
a·ssigned from the circuit bench. In refusing to recog-
nize.the ap·peal the court stated: 
"Since plaintiff does not have authority to 
transport machinery, equipment, materials and 
supplies used in or in connection with the manu-
facturing of paper from Chicago and Joliet, Ill. 
and Hammond and S-outh Bend, Indiana to Chilli-
cothe, it has no legal interest or standing to chal-
lenge the granting of such authority to Craig 
Trucking Inc." 
The fact that the Utah Pipe Line Company was al-
lowed to enter its appearance as a protestant before 
the Public Service Commission does not vest in it a 
right to app·eal to the court. This matter was considered 
by the U. · S. Supreme Court in the case of Pittsburg 
and West Virginia Railroad Company v. United States 
(281-US 479). Th~ Supreme Court stated: 
"The district court held that the appellant 
was entitled to bring this suit under the Urgent 
Deficiencies Act to set aside the order because 
it had intervened in the proceedings b~fore the 
Commission, and because it is a connecting car-
rier and a minority ·stockholder of the Wheeling. 
The court erred in so holding. The mere fact 
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that appellant 'vas permitted to intervene before 
the Comn1ission does not entitle it to institute 
an independent suit to set aside the, Commission's 
order, in the absence of resulting actual or threat-
ened legal injury to it. Alexander Sprunt & Son 
v. lT nited States, 281 U. S. 249, ante, 832·, 50 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 315. Nor does the mere fact that its lines 
connect """ith those of the Wheeling near the city 
of Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, entitle it to bring 
the suit. Its lines do not extend to Cleveland·; and 
there is no suggestion that the order can affect 
it as carrier." 
Whether or not the petitioners were parties in the 
action before the Commission is wholly immaterial to 
its right to bring these proceedings. The only question 
determinative of its right to be before this court is 
whether or not they actually have any right that is af-
fected by the order. This problem was again considered 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Edward Hines 
Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States -(263 US. 216). 
The Supreme Court states : 
"The mere fact that plaintiffs were not par-
ties to the proceeding in which the order was 
entered does not constitute a bar to this suit. F·or 
it is brought to set aside an order alleged to be 
in excess of the Commission's power. Interstate 
Commerce Commission v. Diffenbaugh, 222 U.S. 
42, 56 L. ed. 83, 88, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 22; Skinner 
& E. c·orp·. v. United States, 249 U.S·. 557. 63 L. 
ed. 772, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375. But plaintiffs could 
not maintain this suit merely by showing (if true) 
that the Commission was without power to order 
the penalty charges canceled. They must show 
also that the order alleged to be void subjects 
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them to legal injury, actual or threatened. This 
they have wholly failed to do." 
Not only does the petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
fail to state facts indicating a justiciable interest in 
the controversy in this petition, it in fact states facts 
which negative the existence of such an interest. 
For the reasons above stated, it is the position of 
the Public Service· Commission of Utah that the petition 
of Utah Pipe Line Company should be dismissed with-
out a consideration of the fundamental issues involved 
there·in. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION HAS AUTHORITY TO 
ISSUE CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATES OF CONVENIENCE 
AND NECESSITY 
The. petitioners' brief from the beginning oiVer to 
page 96 is devoted to argument and cases holding that 
Public S.ervice Commissions and other regulatory bodies 
were within their rights in refusing to grant Certificates 
of Convenience and Necessity where the evidence failed 
to show either an adequate supply of the commodity to 
be sold or the financial ability on the part of the peti-
tioner to c~rry on the business proposed. With this 
argument and with the cases cited in support thereof, 
the Public S.ervice Commission of Utah has no quarrel. 
UndoubtedlY,, it would have been within the power of the 
c·ommission in this case on the evidence presented to 
have re~used to grant the Certificate of c·onvenience 
, and Necessity to the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Com-
pany. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
The evidence as presented at the hearing clearly 
shows that there is a need for an additional supply of 
natural gas in the area proposed to be served by Utah 
Natural Gas Con1pany. This much the petitioner, Utah 
Pipe Line Company, admits. In fact it makes that al-
legation in its own petition which is now on file before 
the Con1mission and before the Federal Power Commis-
sion. It is also true, as the petitioner states, that the 
evidence fails to show a sufficient supply of proven gas 
reserves to 1nake the construction of the pipe line p-ro-
posed by Utah Natural Gas Company fea~ible. Like-
wise the evidence shows that until the estimated gas re-
serves are proven, the company would not have avail-
, 
able sufficient . finances to construct the proposed line. 
On the other hand, the evidence is equally clear that 
the estimated reserves, if p-roven, would be sufficient to 
justify the construction of the line proposed and that 
if the reserves as estimated are proved that adequ~te 
financing will be available to Utah Natural Gas C.om-
pany. The question presented to this court for decision 
therefore is as follows: Where the public demand for 
the commodity is established and where an estimated 
supply is sufficient to meet the requirements of the con-
struction proposed, may the public Service Commission 
issue a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity condi-· 
tional upon the proving of the estimated supplies~ The 
Public Service c·ommission of Utah believes that it has 
that power and authority and proceeded accordingly 
in issuing the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
which is challenged in this action. 
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Section 76-4-24, U.C.A., 1943 in regard to the powers 
of the Commission to issue Certificates of Convenience 
and Necessity says in part: 
"* * * the Commission shall have power after 
a hearing to issue said Certificate as prayed for 
or to refuse· to issue the same, or to issue it for 
the construction of a portion of the contemplated 
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway, 
line, plant or system, or extension thereof, or for 
the partial exercise only of said right or privi-
lege and may attach to the exercise of the rights 
granted by said certificate such terms and condi-
tions as in its judgment public convenience and 
necessity may require. * * *" 
It may be contended by the· petitioner that the power 
of the Commission to place conditions in the Certificate 
goes merely to the extent of placing therein conditions, 
the failure to meet which will cause a canc-ellation· of the 
Certificate. However, a further reading of this same 
section shows that that is not the case. This further 
excerpt clearly shows that it was the intention of the 
Legislature to grant the c·ommission power to issue a 
c·onditional C·ertificate where certain of the requisites 
for the issuing have not been proved. One of the things 
which a utility contemplating the securing of a Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity must do before· hav-
ing the Certificate issued is to secure franchises from the 
cities, towns and counties in which it intends to oper-
ate. The issuance of this franchise, is a condition pre-
cedent to the operation under the Certificate. It is a legal 
condition precedent which is just as binding and which is 
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just as necessary as the physical conditions precedent 
of adequate supply and adequate financing. However, 
the statute provides that before securing the franchise 
from the city or town, the utility may nevertheless make 
application to the Connnission for a Certificate of c·on-
venience and Necessity and the Commission may issue 
the certificate conditioned upon the later securing of 
the franchise from the city or town in question. The stat-
ute reads as follows : 
"* * * If a public utility desires to exercise 
a right or privilege under a franchise or permit 
which it contemplates securing but which has not 
yet been granted to it, such public utility may 
apply to the commission for an order preliminary 
to the issue of the certificate. The Commission 
may thereupon make an order declaring that it 
will thereafter upon application, under such rules 
and regulations as it may prescribe, issue the 
desired certificate upon such terms and condi-
tions as it may designate after the public 'utility 
has obtained such contemplated franchise or pHr-
mit. Upon presentation to the c·ommission of 
evidence satisfactory to it that such franchise 
or permit has been secured by such public utility, 
the commission shall thereupon issue such , cer-
tificate." 
That is exactly what the Commission has done in 
this case. The Commission has found that the reserves 
are not yet proven, however, it has issued an Order 
granting the Certificate conditionally providing how-
ever in the said Order that before the applicant may 
exercise its rights under the Certificate, it must make 
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a showing to the Commission that it has the proven 
reserves and that it has the financial ability to carry 
forward the construction of the pipe line proposed. 
The right of Public Service Commissions to thus issue 
Conditional Certificates has been recognized by many 
Commissions and it is fairly common for such condi-
tions to be attached. 
The Public Service Commission of the State of 
Arkansas in re Southwestern Gas & Electric c·ompany 
decided on Dece·mber 12, 1949 and reported at 82 Public 
Utilities Rep. (new series) 52, had before it an appli-
cation for a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity 
by an electrical utility proposing to build a power line 
to transmit power from a government dam which was 
at the time under construction. At the time of the 
issuing of the certificate, the applicant had negotiations 
under way with the Government for a contract to pur-
chase the power to be produced by the dam being con-
structed. s.uch contract, however, was not at the time 
of the application, nor at the date of the final Order 
thereon completed. The Commission nevertheless issued 
a Conditional Certificate to be effective only if the con-
tract with the Government for the purchase of the 
power was completed. 
In the case of Tennessee Gas Transmission Com-
pany decided by the F'ederal Power Commission Decem-
ber 7, 1948 and reported at 76 Public Utilities Reporter 
(new series) 422, the applicant had a p-roposed financing 
plan which it submitted to the Commission. The pro-
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posed plan, however, did not contemplate competitive 
bidding for its securities. Nevertheless the F·ederal 
Power Commission granted the petition with the pro-
vision that a new plan of financing acceptable to the 
Commission which would include competitive bidding 
for the securities be submitted, and that upon the sub-
mission of the satisfactory plan the company could 
proceed to operate under the Certificate being granted. 
The Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line c·ompany made 
application to the Federal Power Commission for a 
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity. The Federal 
Power Commission issued the certificate but inserted 
the condition in the certificate that before the Panhandle 
Eastern could exercise the rights thereunder they must 
submit their proposed financing plan to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and obtain approval of that 
Commission. This right of the Federal Power c·ommis-
sion to impose this condition was challenged by the 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company in the case of 
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company vs. Federal 
Power Commission reported at 169 Federal (2d) 881. 
The _Federal court in that decision upheld the authority 
of the Federal Power Commission to grant the condi-
tional c·ertifica te. 
As has been above stated the Public Service Com-
mission of Utah feels that it acted within its granted 
powers in issuing the Certificate in question with the 
conditions therein contained even though the evidence 
as presented at the hearing did not show that the esti-
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mated reserves of Utah Natural Gas Company were 
proved to the extent that the Commission could make a 
finding thereon. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION MADE NO DELE-
GATION OF ITS AUTHORITY. 
It is contended by the Petitioner that the Public 
Service Commission of Utah in the Certificate of Con-
venience and Necessity issued on March 12, 1951 dele-
gated to a geologist the power of the Commission to 
make a finding as to the adequacy of the gas supply 
of Utah Natural Gas Company. This, the Commission 
did not intend to do and does not believe that it did do. 
In order to determine whether or not there is an 
adequate supply of gas it is, of course, necessary for 
the Commission to lean very heavily upon the testimony 
of expert witnesses on this subject. The c·ommission 
has listened to experts produced by Utah Natural Gas 
Company, by Utah Pipe Line Company and other inter-
ested parties and reserves the right to make its own 
investigation to aid it to determine this· fact. If the 
language of the Commission order is subject to the 
interpretation placed thereupon by Petitioner, it cer-
tainly carries a meaning not intended by the Commis-
sion and for the inaptness of the language, if such exists, 
counsel takes full responsibility. Upon the expiration 
of the one year period granted in the certificate in which 
the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, may present 
evidence that it has an adequate supply of gas and 
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adequate financing available it is the intention of the 
Public Service Con1n1ission of Utah to again set. the_ 
matter down for hearing. ~t\..ll interested parties will be 
given notice and "~ill be given an opportunity to appear. 
The burden of proof "ill be upon the applicant, Utah. 
Natural Gas Company to prove to the satisfaction of 
the Commission that an adequate supply of gas is avai_l-: 
able. This proof, of course, must come in the form of. 
testimony by competent witnesses. The petitioner in 
this case, as well as all other protestants, will be given 
an opportunity to controvert this evidence if they feel. 
that it is not reliable. However, the Commission felt 
that before it should proceed with any such hearing: 
the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, should first 
furnish the Commission with documentary e:vidence, 
which would establish prima facie that the requirement$ 
of the certificate had been met. It was not and-....-is not-
the intention of the Commission to delegate any of its·: 
powers. When the necessary evidence is in as to whether 
or not the conditions of the certificate have been. met~­
the Commission will then consider this additional evi-
dence and on the basis of that evidence will reach its 
own findings as to whethe·r or not Utah Natural Gas 
Company has complied with the orders of the Commis-
sion and is entitled to have its certificate made uncon-
ditional. 
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TIJE ,COMMISSION DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY IN 
PROCEEDING TO HEAR FIR.ST· THE APPLICATION FILED 
FIRST. ' . 
) ,· 
Th~ application of Utah Natural Gas Co:mpany 
was filed with the Commission on May . 29, i950. · No 
immediate demand for hearing was made and the. I Com-
mission having other matters to attend to did ~()t set 
th·e· matter down for hearing. On November 17, 195o;~ 
the Utah Natural Gas Company filed an amended appli-· 
cation and then asked that the Commission proceed to· 
hearing thereon. Accordingly, the Commission set the 
matter . d:own for December 11, 1950. At ,the time the 
h<:}aring for Utah Natural Gas Company was set, the 
Commission was not aware that such a company as Utah 
Pip~: 'Line Company existed or that it intended to 'make 
any-'· application to this Commission. An investigation 
of· the:· records of the S·ecretary of State's office :will 
show that the Utah Pipe Line Company was not even 
qualified· to do business in the State of Utah. until :the 
9th day of Deeember, 1950. Only on the mornipg o.f 
Dec~mb~r 11, 1950, the date set for hearing ~on1e 'Y~~~i 
previously on the Utah Natural Gas Company ,cas~, 
' , , I •;, \(; 
was (he petition of Utah Pipe Line Company filed, wit}). 
the Commission. If the petition of U~ah Pipe Lin~:Co~·~: 
pany had bee·n filed before the date ':for hearing set-'for 
Utah': Natural Gas Company's application;· it is prob-
able that the. Commission would have set the two· matters· 
downr together. However, after this matter ... had': been 
set, after notice had been given and after the p~rties 
interested were assembled to hear the evidence on the 
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petition of Utah Natural Gas Company the Com1nission 
did not feel that it should continue this n1atter merely 
because another company had seen fit, on the very morn-
ing of the hearing, to file another application. If such 
were the practice of the c·ommission it would seldom 
get a hearing completed. 
The officers of lTtah Pipe Line Company knew, or 
should have known, for a considerable period before 
December 11, 1950 of the pendancy of the application 
of Utah Natural Gas Company. The local papers gave 
wide publicity to this application when it was first filed 
in ~Iay of 1950. In view of the circumstances surround-
ing the filing of the petition of Utah Pipe Line Com-
pany, the C·ommission felt that it should proceed with 
the hearing of the first application filed as expeditiously 
as possible. 
This matter was considered by the Supreme Court 
of Iowa in the case of Haase vs. Iowa State Commerce 
Commission, 40 N.W. (2d) 612, where the Supreme 
Court held that the Public Service Commission need 
not necessarily grant the certificate to the first applicant 
in point of time, but that all other things being equal 
that matter may be considered in determining who 
should be allowed to render the service being sought. 
THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. 
In the case of Collett vs. Public Service Commis-
sion, 211 Pac. ( 2d) 185 this court stated : 
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. "It s~ould be kept in mind that the primary 
Interest Involved in these cases is that of the 
public. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public 
Service Commission, 103 Utah 459, 135 Pac. (2d) 
915. The "convenience" and "necessity'' involved 
in the determination of an application is the 
public convenience and necessity, not that of 
individuals. * * *" 
In the case of Mulcahy vs. Public Service Commis-
sion, 117 Pac. (2d) 98 this court went into a very de-
tailed discussion of what constitutes public convenience 
and necessity. As has been pointed out above, there 
can be no question in this case but that it is in the 
public interest that a new supply of gas be brought 
into the populous sections of the state of Utah. This 
was the thought uppermost in the minds of the members 
of the Public Service Commission of Utah when issuing 
the Order complained of in this case. · The Commission 
desired to adopt and believed that it did adopt the 
course designed to fill this need in the quickest and most 
satisfactory manner. It appeared from the evidence 
at the hearing that the Utah Natural Gas Company was 
well along in its planning to provide gas to prospective 
customers. It further appeared that associates of Utah 
Natural Gas Company had spent considerable sums in 
exploration work to bring in new gas supplies within 
the state. It further appeared that the drilling program 
of these associates would be greatly accelerated if some 
assurance were given ·them that they would be able to 
market the gas which they might develop. 
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The Con1mission felt in this tlase, and still feel8, 
that the only n1atter for consideration by the Cominis-
sion 'vas the question of bringing in a gas sup·ply at the 
earliest possible date. Ordinarily in hearing an appli-
cation for a certificate of convenience and necessity the 
Commission is also concerned with the welfare of a 
competitive company. In this case the Commission did 
give considerable thought to the situation of Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company, but there was little or no evi-
dence in the case that the Mountain Fuel Supply Com-
pany would be able, within the reasonable future, to 
satisfy the demands for gas. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company has not seen fit to appeal the Commission's 
Order to this court. The Commission does not feel that 
in considering public convenience and necessity it should 
give any consideration at all to the convenience or the 
welfare of the Utah Pipe Line Company. As far as 
appears from the record, the Utah Pipe Line c·ompany 
does not have one dollar invested in the State of Utah. 
It will not lose anything as a competitor of the Utah 
Natural Gas Company except a conjectural advantage 
which it hoped to gain by having a Certificate issued 
to itself. Therefor~, if it appears to the court that the 
action of the Commission in this case was in the interest 
of potential gas users of the State of Utah, it· appears 
that no consideration should be given to any other aspect. 
c·ertainly, there is sufficient evidence in t~e case 
from which the Commission can logically hold that 
the public interest could be best served by .issuing the 
certificate which would encourage the progress of the 
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Utah Natural Gas Company and its associates. In 
regard to the discretionary power of the Commission 
in such a matter, the following language is found in 
Vol. 3, Ponds Public Utilities, 1850: 
"* * * The discretionary power of the com-
mission to grant or withhold certificates of con-
venience to public utility companies is broader 
than its power to govern rates and services of 
such companies. In the exercise of the latter 
powers, the lawful scope of the commission's 
orders is hedged about by statutory and consti-
tutional guaranties and inhibitions. In the grant-
ing or withholding of certificates of convenience, 
no justifiable question touching confiscation of 
property or impairment of vested rights can well 
arise. Time and again this court, in consonance 
with the prevailing attitude of courts throughout 
the country, has declared that it will not substi-
tute its judgment for that of some administrative 
tribunal created by legislative authority for deal-
ing with matters of nonjudicial character; and 
certainly the question whether a competing gas 
company should be licensed to serve industrial 
plants in and around Wichita and Hutchinson is 
peculiarly a question for an official board to 
determine. and one with which a judicial tribunal 
should be slow to meddle. * * *" 
It appears certain that the public interest would 
not be served by any order of this court disturbing the 
action heretofore taken by the Public Service Commis-
, 
. sion of Utah. Before this case comes· to hearing, nine 
months of the one year period given to the· Utah Natural 
Gas Company in which to make its showing of adequate 
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reserves will already haYe elapsed. By the time this 
court could make its order or at least shortly thereafter, 
the defects "~hich Utah Pipe Line Co1npany clain1s exist 
in the proof of the Utah Natural Gas Company would 
either have been rectified or else the certificate of the 
Utah Natural Gas Company would have been re-called 
by its own terms. 
Let us assume that at the end of the year period 
granted, Utah Natural Gas Company is able to prove 
adequate reserves and adequate financial ability. Cer-
tainly, it would then be in the p·ublic interest that they 
should proceed with the construction of the pipe line 
as expeditiously as possible. Any order of this court 
which might cause uncertainty or delay in the progress 
of this company under such circumstances would he 
adverse to the public interest. On the other hand let 
us assume that at the end of the year's period the Utah 
Natural Gas Company is unable to make its showing. 
In that event, the c·erti:ficate heretofore issued to them 
would be null and void and any action of this court in 
setting the same aside would be a useless and futile 
gesture. 
CONCLUSION 
This court is being asked by a non-resident cor-
poration of the State of Utah which does not have a 
dollar invested in this state to weigh the interests of 
the people of this State of Utah against the imagined 
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rights of that corporation to itself be granted a cer-
tificate. None of the many parties before the commis-
sion who form a part of the public of the state of Utah 
and whose interest in whether or not a new supply of 
gas is brought into the State is very real, have found 
any quarrel with the Commission's decision. The Conl-
mission has no prejudice for or against either the Utah 
Natural Gas Company or the Utah Pipe Line Company. 
The members of the Commission have attempted to 
fulfill their duty in protecting the interests -of the public 
of the State of Utah. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CALVIN L. RAMP TON, 
Attorney for Public Service 
Commission of Utah. 
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